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ABSTRACT
This article looks critically at the indeterminate sentencing system that
survived after the elimination of parole in Arizona in 1993. It begins by
exploring the purpose and history of indeterminate sentencing and parole
as well as its earliest constitutional challenges and eventual decline. Next it
compares two commonly confused forms of “release”: parole and executive
clemency. The article then examines the three types of defendants affected
by indeterminate sentences without parole: death row defendants denied
parole eligibility instructions at trial, defendants sentenced with parole at
trial, and defendants whose plea agreement includes parole. Finally, the
article argues that without parole, indeterminate sentencing systems like the
one used in Arizona should be ruled unconstitutional.
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Justice Project; J.D. Howard University.
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This article does not address Arizona Senate Bill 1211 (2018) which may permit parole eligibility for
pleading inmates sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after a minimum number of years.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early days of American criminal law, prisoners guilty of crimes
received and served a fixed, determinate sentence.1 As the nation
developed, sentence reformers introduced a new system where, generally,
prisoners were sentenced to an indeterminate range of years or to “life.”2
Then a parole board would select those prisoners who would be released
once they had served the minimum term.3 In the past thirty years across the
country, determinate sentencing has returned and the process of parole has
been abolished in many states under the banner of “Truth-in-Sentencing.”4
1. Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 659 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. Id. at 190.
3. See id. at 195-96 (noting that the punishment handed down by the court was service of a
minimum term plus whatever additional term the parole board came up with).
4. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1404 (explaining that the purpose of S.B. 1049 was “to promote
truth and accountability in sentencing.”).
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For states that chose to implement Truth-in-Sentencing by returning to
determinate sentencing, this presents no issue. However, if a state
eliminates parole without altering the system of indeterminate sentencing, it
creates a paradox; an indeterminate sentencing scheme is a system that
requires parole.5 Parole is the hallmark of an indeterminate sentencing
system.6 Parole determines the end of an indeterminate sentence; parole
allows for “the state to be able to adjust the length of sentence so that a
person will be supervised as long as he constitutes an unreasonable threat to
life or property, but no longer.”7
When Arizona implemented Truth-in-Sentencing on January 1, 1994, it
eliminated parole for all offenses but did not eliminate indeterminate
sentencing.8 A limited number of Arizona criminal statutes still mandate
indeterminate life sentences, and although parole was eliminated,
defendants routinely received, or pled to, sentences with parole eligibility.9
The United States Supreme Court recently shed light on this situation in
Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch III), which upheld the right of defendants eligible
for the death penalty to inform the jury of their parole eligibility.10 The
court sentenced Shawn Lynch under an Arizona statute that allows for
natural life or an indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of
“release” after twenty-five years as alternatives to the death penalty.11 In
Lynch III, the Court found that parole is not available for adult defendants in
Arizona, despite over two hundred defendants whose sentences include
parole eligibility.12 This creates a significant problem in Arizona’s
sentencing structure; defendants are receiving sentences or pleading guilty
to crimes with stipulated sentences of “life” with the possibility of parole
after serving a minimum term of years.13 Otherwise unheard of in
5. See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington Practical
Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT’G. REP. 60, 61 (2004) (defining “determinate
sentencing” as “a system in which there is no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be
released from prison only after expiration of the sentence imposed (less available good or earned
time).”).
6. Id.
7. Anderson v. Nelson, 352 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
8. See Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch III), 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016) (noting that under Arizona law,
“parole is only available for individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994. . . .”).
9. See generally 1993 Sess. Laws of Ariz. (many of the Arizona laws no longer mandate
indeterminate life sentences).
10. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820.
11. Id. at 1821-22 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A)). Arizona’s sentencing statutes
permitting a sentence of natural life are not addressed by this article. For a discussion of natural life
sentences see Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1101, 1105 (2013); Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why Life Without Parole Should
Be a Sentencing Option in Texas, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 199 (1994).
12. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1818.
13. Michael Kiefer, Hundreds in Arizona got Life with Parole, a Sentence Barred by Law. Did
State Prisons Just Fix the Problem?, THE REPUBLIC (Mar. 30, 2017, 10:05 PM),
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American criminal law, this system of indeterminate sentencing without
parole has created three substantial issues that this paper will address: (1)
capital defendants denied their due process right to inform the jury of their
parole ineligibility under Lynch III are now entitled to a new jury
sentencing; (2) defendants sentenced by the court to an indeterminate life
sentence with the possibility of parole have a due process right to be heard
by a parole board; and (3) defendants are able to withdraw from plea
agreements that promised parole eligibility if the state is unable to provide
the parole hearing or else demand specific performance on their pleas.14
Considering these issues and the due process interest in a parole hearing, it
seems clear that a system of laws that allows for defendants to serve
indeterminate sentences without parole must be unconstitutional.15
II. HISTORY OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING AND PAROLE
Parole and indeterminate sentencing arose as part of the prison reform
movement led by Zebulon Brockway in the latter half of the nineteenth
century.16 The movement aimed to shift the focus of prisons from the
actions of a prisoner’s past, to the cure and prevention of crimes.17
Rehabilitation replaced raw vengeance as the principal theoretical basis for
imprisonment.18 A new sentencing structure with indeterminate sentences
and parole became the most influential product of this movement.19 In an
indeterminate sentencing structure, an administrative board decides the
amount of time actually served while the prisoner is serving time, rather
than a judge deciding the time the prisoner will serve at the time of
sentencing.20 Indeterminate sentences have always included parole and
there has never been a purely indeterminate sentencing scheme put into
effect.21
Brockway receives credit for the first application of indeterminate
sentencing and parole, which he incorporated during his time as
superintendent of the Detroit House of Corrections.22 “In 1869, Brockway
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/03/31/arizona-departmentcorrections-life-with-parole/99850694/.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. James J. Beha II, Redemption to Reform: The Intellectual Origins of the Prison Reform
Movement, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 773, 786 (2008).
17. Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 297, 311 (1974).
18. Warren, 659 F.2d at 189.
19. Beha, supra note 16, at 789.
20. Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 298.
21. See Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 9 (1925).
22. Beha, supra note 16, at 789.
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drafted, and the Michigan legislature enacted, the ‘three years law,’ which
provided for a mandatory three-year sentence for ‘common prostitutes.’”23
Those defendants would have the opportunity for conditional release subject
to the “managing authorities of the house of correction.”24 “Brockway
described this system as ‘the first attempted practical application in America
of the profound principle of the indeterminate sentence system, which
substitutes both in the laws and in prison practice reformatory in place of
the usual punitive regime.’”25
In 1870, the First National Prison Congress endorsed Brockway’s new
system, declaring that “[p]eremptory sentences ought to be replaced by
those of indeterminate duration; sentences limited only by satisfactory proof
of reformation should be substituted for those measured by mere lapse of
time.”26 The new indeterminate sentencing system also required a
specialized bureaucracy to make decisions regarding early release upon the
prisoner’s rehabilitation.27 This abandonment of proportionality rejected
any retributive justification for punishment and allowed for a prisoner’s
release immediately upon effective “cure,” regardless of the severity of the
underlying crime.28
In 1876, Brockway became superintendent of the new Elmira Prison in
New York.29 Brockway turned Elmira into “the laboratory where the
leaders of the movement toward reformatory rehabilitation put their
scientific theories about crime into practical effect.”30 Under the Elmira
system, the convict was sentenced to a statutory-maximum sentence, below
which the time of imprisonment was up to the discretion of the managers of
the Reformatory.31
By 1900, Brockway’s parole system had been adopted in some form by
twenty states.32 Territorial Arizona first offered parole in 1901.33 By 1925,
parole systems could be found in all forty-eight states and in the federal
system.34

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 790.
Id.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY
DISCIPLINE 551 (E.C. Wines ed., 1871).
27. Beha, supra note 16, at 797.
28. Id. at 796.
29. Id. at 799.
30. Id. at 798.
31. Lindsey, supra note 21, at 22.
32. Id. at 40.
33. History of the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, ARIZ. BOARD EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY,
https://boec.az.gov/node/727 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
34. Beha, supra note 16, at 806.
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The legal community also supported the new sentencing system.
Charlton T. Lewis, Harvard Law lector and President of the Prison
Association of New York, declared in an influential article that
indeterminate sentencing was “the one right method of dealing with
crime.”35 He wrote,
[t]here are but two conceivable ways of protecting the community
against its enemy, the criminal; to disarm him or to reconcile him.
But the [determinative] sentence does neither. It restrains him until
the term ends, as if one should cage a man-eating tiger for a month
or a year, and then turn him loose. There is nothing in such a
sentence which tends to reconcile him to his fellows. It commonly
aims at nothing more than to restrain him and hold him safely for
the term, and in most cases he is discharged more the foe of
mankind than before.36
The courts have followed the view that the parole system serves the
public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence.37 The courts
describe the indeterminate sentencing scheme, which leaves the task of
determining when it is safe to release an offender to the trained parole
board, as one that keeps prisoners confined until they show themselves fit
for membership in a free community.38 The courts have also found that
“[t]hese laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender . . .
[i]nstead of trying to break the will of the offender and make him
submissive, the purpose is to strengthen his will to do right and lessen his
temptation to do wrong.”39 Parole boards focus on the likelihood the
prisoner will transgress again, the prisoner’s response to rehabilitative
efforts to assist with a lawful future career, and the degree to which he does
or does not deem himself at war with his society.40
35. Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L. J. 17, 17 (1899).
36. Id. at 18.
37. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); see
also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 332 (2004) (explaining that “[u]nder indeterminate systems,
the length of the sentence is entirely or almost entirely within the discretion of the judge or of the parole
board, which typically has broad power to decide when to release a prisoner.”); United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978) (explaining that “[a] fundamental proposal of [the prison reform
movement] was a flexible sentencing system permitting judges and correctional personnel, particularly
the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to informed judgments concerning their potential
for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism.”); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 367 (1998) (explaining that “one of the purposes of parole is to reduce the costs of
criminal punishment while maintaining a degree of supervision over the parolee.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
1–211(A) (2016) (directing statutes be construed consistently with the intent of the legislature).
38. Warren, 659 F.2d at 190.
39. Ex parte Lee, 171 P. 959 (Cal. 1918).
40. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 51.
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Scholars and experts consistently agree that parole is essential to a
system where prisoners are sentenced to a range of years and not a definite
term. In Commissioner Samuel Barrows’ 1899 report to the International
Prison Commission, he believed “[t]he definite sentence deals wholly with a
convict’s past . . . [and] [u]nder the indefinite sentence the attention of the
prisoner and of the state is fixed upon the future.”41 Edwin Abbott, as
Secretary of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology,
wrote in 1912, “[i]n some states a model prisoner is automatically entitled to
parole upon the expiration of his minimum sentence; in other states no time
is specified and it is entirely within the discretion of the parole board.”42
Wilbur LaRoe, former chairman of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole of the District of Columbia, wrote an authoritative book on the parole
systems of the United States in 1939.43 LaRoe describes indeterminate
sentences where, “the sentencing judge shares with the board of parole
responsibility for deciding the length of sentence, the court fixing the
minimum and maximum, but the board determining at what precise point
between the minimum and maximum the prisoner is ready for release.”44
Professor Martin Gardner wrote in 1980 that the indeterminate sentence, in
short, “‘describe[s] any prison sentence for which the precise term of
confinement is not known on the day of judgment but will be subject within
a substantial range to the later decision of a parole board or some
comparable agency under whatever name.’”45 Criminologist Michael
Tonry, noted in 1999 that the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s central
distinction between determinate and indeterminate “systems was whether
parole release remained available for a sizable fraction of cases.”46 No
scholars or experts have considered a system of indeterminate sentencing
without parole as a legal possibility.

41. WARREN SPALDING, THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES, in THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND THE PAROLE LAW: REPORTS PREPARED
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PRISON COMMISSION 7, 13 (Samuel Barrows ed., 1899).
42. See Edwin M. Abbott, Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543, 546 (1913) (questioning whether indeterminate sentencing is a beneficial
feature of the parole system).
43. See WILBUR LAROE, PAROLE WITH HONOR 187 (1939).
44. Id.
45. Martin R. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and The Eighth Amendment:
Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1103 n.1 (1980).
46. Michael Tonry, Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured Sentencing, NAT’L INST. JUST.,
Sept. 1999, at 7-8.
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A. Early Judicial Challenges to Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole
Systems
The change from the judicially imposed determinative sentences to the
new indeterminate sentences with parole boards did not happen without
challenges.47 Brockway’s indeterminate sentences in Michigan did not last
long.48 The Michigan Supreme Court held indeterminate sentences
unconstitutional, reasoning that under the state constitution “[t]he Governor
has the undoubted right to pardon.”49 The court further reasoned that “this
parole system is as obnoxious to the Constitution as an unconditional
release by the board would be; and, if they have the power to release on
conditions, those conditions may be made so trifling as in fact to be no
conditions at all.”50 Michigan subsequently amended its constitution in
1901, which authorized the legislature to provide for indeterminate
sentencing laws as punishment for crime, and the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld the amendment.51 Other state courts similarly held the early
indeterminate sentences and parole unconstitutional.52
In 1902, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld indeterminate
sentencing and parole.53 In Dreyer v. Illinois, the indeterminate sentencing
statute in the State of Illinois was challenged for conferring “judicial powers
upon a collection of persons who do not belong to the judicial department,
and, in effect, invests them with the pardoning power committed by the
constitution to the Governor of the State.”54 The Court held that the Illinois
statute “presents no question under the Constitution of the United States.”55
The Court reasoned that “[w]hether the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate . . . is for the
determination of the State.”56 Ughbanks v. Armstrong,57 quickly followed
Dreyer, and the Court upheld the new Michigan constitutional amendment

47. See People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310, 314 (Mich. 1891); see also Brownbridge v. People,
38 Mich. 751, 754, 755 (1878).
48. See Cummings, 50 N.W. at 314; see also Brownbridge, 38 Mich. at 754.
49. See Cummings, 50 N.W. at 313; see also Brownbridge, 38 Mich. at 754 (“The common law
has always condemned vague and indefinite sentences and has not inclined to the introduction of any
involving conditional punishments.”).
50. Cummings, 88 N.W. at 313.
51. In re Campbell, 101 N.W. 826-28 (Mich. 1904).
52. See In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 51 A. 10, 15 (Vt. 1901) (determining a board of
parole violates power of executive); see also State ex rel. Bishop v. State Bd. of Corrections, 52 P. 1090,
1091, 1092 (Utah 1898) (also, determining a board of parole violates power of executive).
53. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902).
54. Id. at 71, 83.
55. Id. at 83-84.
56. Id. at 84.
57. 208. U.S. 481 (1908).
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authorizing indeterminate sentences, holding that states have the power to
exempt a person twice convicted of a felony from parole eligibility.58
B. End of Federal Parole and Return to Determinate Sentencing
As the twentieth century progressed, issues with indeterminate
sentencing emerged. The system received criticism for allegations of
racism.59 Data showed that “black offenders receive[d] somewhat longer
sentences for the same offenses than [did] white offenders.”60 Scholars also
noted there was substantial gender disparity in indeterminate sentencing in
favor of women.”61 The most prominent criticism came from the system’s
“failure to remedy the situation for which it was designed: recidivism.”62
According to the 1967 report of the President’s Crime Commission, nearly
everyone who goes to prison is eventually released and between one-half
and two-thirds of all those released are eventually later arrested and
convicted again.63 These repeat offenders are called recidivists.64 In one
study on recidivism, “[n]early one-third of the subjects failed in the first
year to remain free of arrest or of parole or mandatory release violations.”65
To address the problems of high recidivism rates and disparity in
sentencing, the federal government passed the Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA) of 1984, creating the Federal Sentencing Guides and abolishing
parole for federal prisoners sentenced after November 1, 1987.66 Twentyeight states followed by implementing sentencing guidelines and Truth-inSentencing statutes between 1996 and 1998.67 Its success in reducing
recidivism is disputed.68
58. Id. at 487.
59. Richard Singer, In Favor of “Presumptive Sentences” Set by a Sentencing Commission, 5
CRIM. JUST. Q. 88, 88 (1977).
60. See id.; see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, rather than
reflect legally relevant criteria, these disparities too often were correlated with constitutionally suspect
variables such as race.”).
61. Tonry, supra note 46.
62. Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, or Just Plain
Cruel?, 16 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 95 (1990).
63. Id. at 111-12 n.146.
64. Id.
65. Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce
Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 797 (1993).
66. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Probation, 55 J. CORRECTIONAL PHIL. & PRAC.,
Dec. 1991, at 1; see Mark H. Luttrell, The Impact of the Sentencing Reform Act on Prison Management,
55 J. CORRECTIONAL PHIL. & PRAC., Dec. 1991, at 54.
67. Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison
Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 76 (1999).
68. See William D. Bales et al., An Assessment of the Development and Outcomes of Determinate
Sentencing in Florida, JUST. RES & POL.: FLA., May 2010, at 41, 61 (finding that truth-in-sentencing has
contributed to Florida’s recidivism reduction); but see Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary
Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO
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The inherent impossibility of an indeterminate sentencing system
without parole was recently recognized in the fallout over the Federal
Sentencing Guides in the mid-2000s.69 A pair of Supreme Court decisions
limited the applicability of the SRA, causing speculation that the United
States might return to an indeterminate sentencing system.70 In Blakeley v.
Washington, the Court required that any fact increasing a sentence beyond
the maximum sentence a judge may impose without making any additional
findings of fact “must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless
the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights in this regard.”71
Blakeley was quickly followed by United States v. Booker, in which the
Court struck down two provisions of the SRA: the section making the
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory and the establishment of appellate review
standards for the Guidelines’ sentences.72 Scholars noted an evolution in
the definition of indeterminate sentences from a broad range set by a judge
with a parole board determining the ultimate release date, to a post-Blakeley
definition which allows judges to set a definite sentence anywhere below
the statutory maxima.73 Arizona’s statute does neither.74 It creates a broad
indeterminate range set by the judge, without a parole board, to determine
the ultimate release date.75 This sentencing structure as it stands rejects the
entire premise that parole boards and indeterminate sentences were built
upon and is completely contrary to both the academic and the legal
understanding of how indeterminate sentences work.
L. REV. 1, 45, 46 (2011) (arguing that indeterminate sentencing is the most cost-effective means of
reducing recidivism).
69. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235, 245-46, 26465 (2005).
70. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50; see Booker, 543 U.S. at 235, 245-46, 264-65.
71. United States v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Blakely, 124
S. Ct. at 2536); see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 322
(2013).
72. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 259.
73. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 382 n.18
(2005) (identifying a number of cases where judges use an incorrect definition of ‘indeterminate
sentencing’). These cases include: United States v. Hakley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15784, at *21 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 12, 2004) (displaying an incorrect understanding of “indeterminate” sentencing); United
States v. Agett, 327 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); United States v. Sisson, 326 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in light
of Blakely and erroneously describing the Court’s “return to an indeterminate sentencing scheme” when
the context indicates that the court will employ a discretionary, determinate sentencing system and
apparently treat the Guidelines as fully voluntary); United States v. Lockett, 325 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78
(E.D. Va. 2004)); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2468 n.12 (2004) (referring to both modern and traditional definitions of indeterminate and
determinate sentencing).
74. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09 (LexisNexis 2017).
75. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 116 (1991) (noting that the state, “recommended an
indeterminate life sentence with a minimum of ‘somewhere between ten and [twenty] years.’”); In re D.,
617 P.2d 1087, 1089, 1092, 1093 (Cal. 1980) (“[C]onstitutes an indeterminate [twenty-five] years to life
sentence.”).
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In the fallout from the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision, several
federal courts held the entire SRA unconstitutional and some referred to a
reversion to indeterminate sentencing.76 In United States v. King, the
Middle District of Florida held that “the unavoidable result of finding the
[Federal Sentencing] Guidelines unconstitutional in their entirety is a return
to an indeterminate system.”77
However, the court defined the
indeterminate system as selecting a determinate sentence from an
indeterminate range.78 The court in King relied on United States v.
Einstman, which defined an indeterminate sentencing system as one where
“judges are free to consider all relevant factors and to sentence the
defendant anywhere between the statutory minimum (if there be one) and
the statutory maximum[.]”79 Neither the court in King nor the court in
Einstman proposed anything like the system currently employed in
Arizona.80
The District of Massachusetts, in United States v. Mueffelman,81
rejected the idea that an indeterminate sentencing system could exist
without parole, stating “plainly there is a problem with reinstituting an
indeterminate system, when there is no longer parole.”82 The District of
Utah reached the same conclusion as Mueffelman in United States v.
Wilson.83 While recognizing the sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional,
the court held it will continue to give the guidelines considerable weight and
that without parole “rehabilitation is a subordinate consideration to just
punishment and crime control.”84 The courts in Mueffelman and Wilson
thus considered and rejected the system currently in place in Arizona.85
Heritage Foundation fellow Paul Larkin, commenting on the end of the
SRA and a possible resurrection of federal parole, wrote in 2013, “[a]n
advisory Sentencing Guidelines system without parole would have resulted
in a far worse punishment mechanism, one with no check on system-wide
sentencing disparities[.]”86 Every scholar since the start of sentencing
76. See Einstman, 325 F. Supp at 381; see also United States v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1276,
1284 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
77. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
78. See id. at 1287 (utilizing a sentencing range of five to forty years, the first defendant received
forty-eight months, the second defendant received sixty months).
79. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
80. See id.; see also King, 328 F. Supp. at 1284.
81. 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004).
82. Id. at 96.
83. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 922 (D. Utah 2005).
84. Id. at 921.
85. See Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. at 96; Wilson, 350 F. Supp. at 922; see also ARIZ. STATE
SENATE,
TRUTH
IN
SENTENCING
1-2
(2010),
http://www.azleg.gov/briefs/Senate/TRUTH%20IN%20SENTENCING.pdf.
86. Larkin, supra note71, at 333.
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reform in the nineteenth century recognizes what the court in Mueffelman
concluded, that parole is required for an indeterminate sentencing system.87
C. Arizona after Truth-in-Sentencing: Indeterminate Sentencing without
Parole
The Arizona legislature passed the state’s Truth-in Sentencing statute in
1993.88
The law eliminated parole and reintroduced determinative
sentences with the opportunity for earned release credits.89 Most Arizona
criminal defendants can expect to be released for good behavior after
serving 85% of their sentence.90 However, the new Truth-in Sentencing law
did not amend Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes; it only
eliminated parole for all offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994.91
Four statutes in Arizona still impose indeterminate sentences of “life with
the possibility of [release] after twenty-five [or thirty-five] years.”92 Under
the current sentencing scheme, release possibilities are limited to executive
clemency or a future legislative change. The first Arizona prisoners will
reach their minimum time served in 2019, and will be able to challenge the
limited possibilities of release.93
“Release” is not clearly defined by statute, but includes “parole, work
furlough, community supervision[.]” for the purpose of offenses committed
while released from confinement.94 For Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing
scheme the two commonly used types of release are parole and executive
clemency, which the courts have repeatedly conflated.95 Some Arizona

87. Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. at 96.
88. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1404 (explaining that the purpose of S.B. 1049 was “to promote
truth and accountability in sentencing”); see also ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85 (encouraging the
Arizona law with a new program, the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS)
Incentive Grant Program). “During a five-year period, [the Arizona Department of Corrections] received
a total of $57,923,000 in VOI/TIS grants, which are nonappropriated, for the development of additional
medium and maximum security prisoner bed space.” Id. at 2.
89. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85.
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(LexisNexis 2017).
91. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746 (amending Arizona’s capital-sentencing statute creating,
among other changes, a sentence of natural life, which “[i]s not subject to commutation or parole, work
furlough or work release.”) (emphasis added); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–716 (LexisNexis 2017)
(extending eligibility has since been extended to juvenile offenders serving “life” sentences); see also
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
92. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-751 (LexisNexis 2016) (murder); § 13–705 (LexisNexis 2016)
(sexual conduct with a minor) §13-706 (LexisNexis 2016) (serious offenders); § 13-1003 (LexisNexis
2016) (conspiracy).
93. See, e.g., State v. Sperberg, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0156-PR, 2010 WL 4286203, at *191, *195
(Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2010) (involving a 1994 murder plea).
94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-708.
95. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09 (LexisNexis 2017); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-403
(LexisNexis 2017).
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courts have upheld sentences of “life with a possibility of parole,”96 while
others have upheld sentences of “life with a possibility of release.”97
In the pre-Lynch III line of death penalty cases, when the courts refused
to allow the defendants to inform the jury of their parole ineligibility, courts
held that the defendants “would have been eligible for other forms of
release, such as executive clemency[.]”98 However, the court is mistaken.
Release is not the same as executive clemency.99 Arizona’s Truth-in
Sentencing law only eliminated the mechanism for parole eligibility.100
Prisoners sentenced to “life with the possibility of release” should still be
entitled to a hearing before the parole board and not limited to an
application for clemency.
III. POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE: PAROLE OR CLEMENCY?
A threshold issue needs to be addressed before examining the validity
of Arizona’s indeterminate “life” sentences: whether executive clemency
offers a suitably equivalent opportunity for release as parole. It does not.
A. From ‘Parole’ to ‘Release’
Arizona has provided a system of parole since statehood.101 A “life”
sentence has provided the possibility of parole since at least 1973, when the
legislature amended section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute (then
titled section 13-453) to make defendants who are sentenced to life
imprisonment eligible for parole after twenty-five years.102 In 1985, the
Arizona legislature passed House Bill 2218, Crimes Against Children,
which removed the word “parole” from section 13-751 of the Arizona
Revised Code (then titled section 13-703) and replaced it with the phrase
“release on any basis,” language identical to that can be found in the parole
eligibility statute section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute (then

96. See State v. Ovante, 291 P.3d 974, 977 (Ariz. 2013) (sentencing for a 2008 murder).
97. See State v. Brown, 310 P.3d 29, 32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (sentencing for a 2010 murder).
98. See, e.g., State v. Cota, 272 P.3d 1027, 1042 (Ariz. 2012).
99. Release, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/release (last
visited Feb. 21, 2018); Executive Clemency, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/executive+clemency (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
100. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85, at 1.
101. See Laird v. Sims, 147 P. 738, 742 (Ariz. 1915) (“all prisoners who have served the minimum
sentence, when it is an indeterminate sentence, as well as those serving definite or fixed sentences, may
appear and apply for a parole or an absolute discharge.”); see also State ex rel. Murphy v. Super. Ct. of
Maricopa Cty., 246 P. 1033, 1035 (Ariz. 1926) (“The Legislature having provided for a minimum and a
maximum term of sentence, it certainly accords with reason to assume that it had a purpose in so doing .
. . The reason and the language of the legislation can point to but one conclusion, and that is that a
prisoner sentenced to an indeterminate sentence should at all events serve the minimum thereof.”).
102. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 719.
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titled section 41-1604.06).103 “Release on any basis” is also the phrase
found in the conspiracy to commit murder statute, last amended in 1978.104
As part of the 1985 law, the legislature amended the parole eligibility
statute, section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute, to require
defendants sentenced under section 13-751 to serve the full minimum term
instead of two-thirds of the sentence.105 The 1985 Arizona Legislative
Report includes no reference to parole,106 nor did courts change their
criminal sentencing practices.107 In 1985, “release” still meant “parole,” but
the new law worked to prohibit release on parole, or any other means, until
the prisoner served the mandatory twenty-five years.108
In 1993, the Arizona legislature passed House Bill 2048, adding the
possible sentence of “natural life” for murder defendants in addition to the
death penalty and the indeterminate “life” sentence.109 The legislature
indicated that a defendant sentenced to “natural life” is, among other things,
not eligible for parole.110 This change in the law kept “without possibility
of release” for indeterminate sentences, which is the phrase used to refer to
parole eligibility since 1985 for murder, and since 1978 for conspiracy to
commit murder.111 Two days after passing House Bill 2048, the legislature
passed Senate Bill 1049, Truth-in-Sentencing, which limited eligibility for
parole under Title 41 to defendants who committed their crime after January
1, 1994, but did not alter the four sentences under which defendants receive
parole eligibility and have historically received parole eligibility.112
During the period between the establishment of Truth-in-Sentencing in
Arizona in 1994 and the Court’s Lynch III decision in 2016, Arizona courts

103. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1438.
104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D) (“Conspiracy to commit a class 1 felony is punishable by a
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis until the service of twenty-five
years. . . .”).
105. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1454.
106. See ARIZ. LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1985 145.
107. Compare State v. Nardi, 2015 WL 503219, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (convicting
defendant of 1991 murder sentenced by trial court to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after
twenty-five years) with State v. Villa, 2010 WL 2892889, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 23, 2010)
(convicting defendant of 1995 murder and sentenced by trial court to life imprisonment with a possibility
of parole after twenty-five years).
108. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1454.
109. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746; see also State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 933 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that
“[i]n 1993, the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. section 13–703 to add a ‘natural life’ sentencing
option for defendants convicted of first degree murder.”).
110. State v. Barreras, 892 P.2d 852, 860 n.7 (Ariz. 1995) (“A.R.S. § 13-703(A) now permits a
sentence of life without possibility of parole.” (citing 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746)).
111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D).
112. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1486.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss2/3

14

Puzauskas and Morrow: NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE

2018] NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE

277

treated “parole,” “release” and “clemency” interchangeably.113 Part of the
overall confusion likely stems from the transfer of power from the former
Board of Pardons and Paroles to the Board of Executive Clemency.114
Additional confusion comes from Arizona statutes that aggravate sentences
for crimes committed while on any form of release.115 However, as a matter
of law and practice, parole and clemency are different concepts.116 A
defendant is far less likely to obtain clemency than parole.
B. Differences in Clemency and Parole Procedures
Parole and clemency are distinct legal terms.117 Parole is defined as
“[t]he conditional release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full
sentence has been served.”118 Clemency is “the power of the President or a
governor to pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence.”119 The two
typical forms of clemency are commutation, which is the reduction in the
severity of punishment, and pardon, or the nullification of the
punishment.120 Arizona uses significantly different procedures to evaluate
clemency and parole applicants.121 Additionally, parole and clemency
fulfill separate purposes.
Clemency applications must meet a higher legal burden than parole
applications. Prisoners seeking clemency may apply to the Board of
Executive Clemency which then
may make recommendations to the governor for commutation of
sentence after finding by clear and convincing evidence that the
113. See, e.g., State v. Boyston, 298 P.3d 887, 901 (Ariz. 2013) (defendant “would have been
eligible for other forms of release, such as executive clemency, if sentenced to life with the possibility of
release.”).
114. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2016) (“The board of executive clemency . . .
is vested with the powers and duties of the board of pardons and paroles as they existed before January
1, 1994.”); see State v. Godinez, No. 2 CA–CR 2013–0114–PR, 2013 WL 3788427, at *2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. July 17, 2013) (finding “of no import the fact that it is no longer the ‘parole board’ but rather the
Board of Executive Clemency to whom a petition for release must be sought in the first instance.”).
115. See State v. Melcher, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0158, 2013 WL 2378573 at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. May
29, 2013). The court relied improperly on Bruggeman to hold that the word parole is not legally
significant and is instead synonymous with “release from confinement,” when Bruggeman found “no
error because there is no distinction between parole and probation under [the crimes committed while on
any form of release statute].” See id.; see also State v. Bruggeman, 779 P.2d 823, 826 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989).
116. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983).
117. Compare Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), with Clemency, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY.
118. Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
119. Clemency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
120. Commutation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY; Pardon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. This paper
focuses exclusively on the commutation form of clemency.
121. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402 (C)(2), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. 31-412(A) (LexisNexis
2016).
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sentence imposed is clearly excessive given the nature of the
offense and the record of the offender and that there is a substantial
probability that when released the offender will conform the
offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law.122
If a commutation of sentence is denied by the Board or if the governor
denies a commutation recommendation by the Board, the person must wait
at least three years before re-applying for commutation, whereas parole
consideration is generally every six months to a year.123 Persons who apply
for clemency face several restrictions for consideration by the Board, and
the governor may not grant a commutation of sentence without a
recommendation from the Board.124
An Arizona commutation hearing occurs in two phases. Phase I is held
in-absentia (the inmate is not in attendance); however, the hearing is open to
the public who may present statements in support or opposition to the
prisoner’s application.125 If the prisoner has legal representation, his or her
counsel may also appear at a Phase I hearing.126 The Phase I hearing is
limited to a consideration of whether the sentence is excessive in light of the
prisoner’s crime and record (the former part of the statute).127 If the Board
agrees by majority vote that the sentence is excessive, the prisoner is passed
to Phase II.128 At a Phase II hearing, the prisoner appears by video.129 The
public and the prisoner’s counsel may also appear.130 The primary question
at a Phase II hearing is whether the prisoner will remain law-abiding upon
release from prison, generally focusing on the prisoner’s prison record and
plans upon release.131 If, after hearing all of the information, the Board
determines that a reduction in time served is appropriate, the Board will
transmit the recommendation to the governor for a final determination.132
In contrast, the decision to grant parole is governed by a requirement to
consider the prisoner’s entire record, “‘including the gravity of the offense
in the particular case.’”133 The inmate is entitled to “an opportunity to be
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–402(C)(2).
123. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09(G).
124. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–403 (LexisNexis 2016).
125. ARIZ. BD. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2015).
126. Frequently Asked Questions, ARIZ. BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY (last visited Feb. 21,
2018), https://boec.az.gov/helpful-information/frequently-asked-questions.
127. ARIZ. BD. OF EX. CLEMENCY, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2).
132. ARIZ. BD. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, supra note 125.
133. Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 717 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1986) (citing
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15).
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heard” on the parole application.134 The Board must “either approve, with
or without conditions, or reject the prisoner’s application for parole[.]”135 In
determining whether to grant parole, the Board must consider whether
“there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at liberty
without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the
state.”136 When parole is denied, the Board provides the Director with “a
written statement specifying the individualized reasons for the denial of
parole,” and the inmate has the opportunity to review the Board’s
statement.137 If the inmate remains eligible for parole, recertification occurs
between one and four months after the hearing at which parole was
denied.138
Finally, parole and clemency fulfill separate purposes in the criminal
justice system.139 The purpose of clemency is to reduce a sentence if it is
excessive, while the purpose of parole is to release prisoners if they will be
law abiding.140 Clemency for those with the possibility of release after
twenty-five years instead of parole is meaningless because the possibility of
parole in twenty-five years is already the most lenient alternative to a
natural life term or death.141
C. Parole is Distinct from Clemency as a Matter of Constitutional Law
The most significant difference between parole and clemency involves a
prisoner’s constitutional right to due process during the proceedings.142 The
Supreme Court of the United States has held, as a matter of law, that “parole
and commutation are different concepts, despite some surface
similarities.”143
A state statute can create a right to be heard by a parole board.144 In
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, the
Supreme Court of the United States determined that states can create a
134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–411(B) (LexisNexis 2016).
135. Id. (C).
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–412(A) (LexisNexis 2016).
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–411(G).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41–1604.09(G). However, the Board may prescribe that the inmate shall
not be recertified for a period of up to one year after the hearing. See id.; see also Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op.
No. I14-007 at *4 (Oct. 3, 2014).
139. Compare Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993) (reasoning “[c]lemency is deeply
rooted in our Anglo–American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted.”), with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (stating that the
“parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence . . . .”).
140. Compare Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12, with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.
141. See State v. Fell, 97 P.3d 902, 912 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 115 P.3d 594 (Ariz. 2005)
(referring to defendants sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-703 (1999), now A.R.S. § 13-751 (2016)).
142. See generally Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (comparing parole and clemency).
143. Id. at 300.
144. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
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liberty interest in parole, therefore granting prisoners the right to due
process.145 Under Greenholtz, a statute that “affords an opportunity to be
heard” satisfies due process.146 Additionally, parole revocation is always
entitled to due process.147 However, unlike parole, the power of the
executive to pardon, or grant clemency, being a matter of grace, is rarely
subject to judicial review.148
There is no general right to clemency.149 In Connecticut Bd. of Pardons
v. Dumschat, the Supreme Court of the United States contrasted a prisoner’s
clemency application with the parole statute in Greenholtz.150 The Court
found that, while a commutation decision shares some of the characteristics
of a decision whether to grant parole,151 “there is a vast difference between a
denial of parole . . . and a state’s refusal to commute a lawful sentence.”152
The Court reasoned that the mere existence of a power to commute a
lawfully imposed sentence, and the granting of commutations to many
petitioners, “create no right or ‘entitlement.’”153
Arizona employs two different standards for parole and clemency.154
The standard to be released is much higher for commutation than for parole;
commutation requires that the Board must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the sentence itself is excessive given the nature of the original
offense and the record of the prisoner.155 The Arizona courts have adopted
the definition of “‘clear and convincing’ that requires the jury to “‘be
persuaded that the truth of the contention is ‘highly probable.’”156 This
standard requires the Board to consider the relationship of the sentence to
the nature of the offense and the record of the prisoner.157 Unless the Board
determines by high evidentiary standard that the sentence is excessive given
the nature of the offense it cannot recommend commutation and, “while the
145. Id. at 24-25.
146. Id. at 16.
147. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (noting that a parolee’s liberty involves
significant values within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
148. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998).
149. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981).
150. Id. at 466.
151. Id. at 464.
152. Id. at 466.
153. Id. at 467.
154. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412(A) (the standard for release on parole is if “it appears to
the Board, in its sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at
liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the state), with ARIZ. REV.
STAT § 31-402(C)(2) (requiring a finding of clear and convincing evidence that the imposed sentence is
“clearly excessive given the nature of the offense” . . . .).
155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–402.
156. State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 390 (Ariz. 2006), abbrogated by State v. Escalante-Orozco,
386 P.3d 798 (Ariz. 2017), (quoting In re Neville, 708 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Ariz. 1985)) (internal citations
omitted).
157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2).
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Courts can compel the Board to act, the Court cannot compel the Board to
act in any particular manner.”158
In Arizona, the decision to release a prisoner on parole focuses
primarily on what a man is and what he may become rather than simply
what he has done.159 The Board considers “‘the entire record . . . to the time
of the sentence, including the gravity of the offense in the particular
case.’”160 Arizona’s parole statute states that the board “shall authorize the
release” of eligible applicants and if “it appears to the board, in its sole
discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will
remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best
interests of the state.” 161 The power of parole rests with the Board and not
in the governor.162 Arizona’s parole statute “uses mandatory language
(‘shall’) to ‘creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when
the designated findings are made.”163 Arizona’s parole statute, like
Nebraska’s in Greenholtz, grants a recognized liberty interest in parole.164
D. Clemency is not a Meaningful Opportunity for Release
In addition to the higher standards, more difficult procedures, separate
public policy principles, and constitutional distinctions, data from the
Arizona Board of Executive Clemency demonstrates just how rare
commutation is as compared to parole.165 The Supreme Court of the United
States has previously examined the statistical likelihood of clemency and

158. State ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa Cty., 467 P.2d
917, 920 (1970).
159. Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 717 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1986) (citing
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (1974)).
160. Id. (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15) (emphasis in original).
161. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–412(A).
162. See State ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 467 P.2d at 920; see also State v.
Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118, 121 (Ariz. 1990) (“The exclusive power to grant parole rests with the Board of
Pardons and Paroles.” (quoting State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988))).
163. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1987) (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12)
(alteration in original) (comparing a Montana statute to a Nebraska statute, both of which used the word
“shall” to indicate that the provision was mandatory)). Likewise, the Arizona parole statute is
mandatory: “If a prisoner is certified as eligible for parole pursuant to § 41-1604.09 the board of
executive clemency shall authorize the release of the applicant on parole . . .” if the statute’s
requirements are met. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412 (emphasis added).
164. See Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 753 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(“Because we conclude that A.R.S. § 31-412 creates a protected liberty interest in parole release, we
must determine what due process rights should have been accorded [the petitioner] and whether the
Board observed them.”); Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. No. I14-007, 2014 WL 5017942, at *4 (Oct. 3, 2014).
165. Terry Reid, Miller v. Alabama: Is Arizona’s Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional as Applied
to Juvenile Offenders Convicted of First Degree Murder?, 24 FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 2014, at 1, 5-6,
https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2443/For-the-Defense—-February-to-April-2014PDF.
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parole to determine if they provide a meaningful opportunity for release.166
Clemency in Arizona is not a meaningful opportunity for release.167
A meaningful opportunity for release is required under the due process
clause.168 The Court held in Solem v. Helm, that a statutory scheme which
only provides for release by commutation does not provide a meaningful
opportunity for release.169 The Court recognized parole as a regular part of
the rehabilitative process and that, assuming good behavior, it is the normal
expectation in the vast majority of cases.170 In contrast to commutation,
which is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency that may occur at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards, the law generally
specifies when a prisoner will be parole eligible, and details the standards
and procedures applicable at that time.171 Thus, it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted.172
The Court in Solem compared clemency in South Dakota for prisoners
with life sentences, with the application of parole in Texas examined in
Rummel v. Estelle,173 to determine if the sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment.174 “In South Dakota, no life sentence has been commuted in
over eight years, while parole—where authorized—has been granted
regularly during that period.”175 Texas had “a relatively liberal policy of
granting ‘good time’ credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has
allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as
little as 12 years.”176 The Court analyzed the statistical difficulty in
obtaining commutation compared with parole and based on those
differences the Court concluded that “[t]he possibility of commutation of a
life sentence under South Dakota law [was] not sufficient to save
respondent’s otherwise unconstitutional sentence on the asserted theory that
this possibility matches the possibility of parole.”177 The Court reasoned
166. Id.
167. See State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
168. See Reid, supra note 165, at 2 (noting that “[i]n 2010, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile
convicted of a non-homicide offense could not be sentenced to life without parole, but must be given
some ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’”
(quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010))).
169. See Solem, 463 U.S. at, 282, 300, 301 (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of
parole imposed upon defendant convicted of uttering no account check for $100 prohibited by Eighth
Amendment).
170. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477 (“[t]he practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of
their sentences has become an integral part of the penological system.”).
171. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412.
172. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.
173. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
174. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297-98.
175. Id. at 279.
176. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280.
177. Solem, 463 U.S. at 278.
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“that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from
the parole system that was before us in Rummel.”178
Statistics provided by the Arizona Board of Clemency show that
between 2004 and 2016 the Board heard an average of 594.9 clemency
hearings per year, recommended an average of 48.2 prisoners a year to the
governor who granted clemency to an average of 6.7, or 1.5% of all
applicants.179 During that same period, the Board granted an average of 88
out of 436 parole applications a year, or 21.3%.180 The data in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 clearly shows that parole offers a significantly higher opportunity
for release than clemency.181

Figure 1: Clemency in Arizona 2004-2016
Phase I
Phase II
Recommendations
FY
Hearing
Hearings
Governor
2004
960
87
87
2005
972
110
101
2006
604
84
52
2007
704
102
70
2008
586
94
63
2009
656
97
61
2010
406
53
41
2011
303
54
47
2012
398
70
50
115
2013
60
24
2014
305
55
26
2015
200
15
2
2016
483
19
2

Granted
11
13
9
4
7
9
6
8
9
6
2
1
n/a

%
1.10%
1.30%
1.50%
0.60%
1.20%
1.40%
1.50%
2.60%
2.30%
0.50%
0.66%
0.50%
<0.41

178. Id. at 300.
179. Reid, supra note 165.
180. See Policies and Reports: Annual Reports Fiscal Years 2014-2017 ARIZ. BOARD EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY (last visited Feb. 21, 2018), https://boec.az.gov/agendas-reports-and-policies/policies-andreports; see also Reid, supra note 165, at 6 (2013 statistics are through July only).
181. Reid, supra note 165, at 5-6.
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Figure 2: Parole in Arizona 2004-2016
FY
Hearings
2004
694
2005
574
2006
485
2007
427
2008
458
2009
472
2010
439
2011
313
2012
329
2013
326
2014
370
2015
390
2016
397

Granted
242
47
126
72
83
88
68
82
72
80
95
46
47

[Vol. 44

%
34.9%
25.6%
26%
16.9%
18.1%
18.6%
15.5%
26.2%
21.9%
24.5%
25.7%
11.8%
11.8%

Clemency in Arizona does not offer the same consideration for release
that parole does. Prisoners described by the Arizona courts as “eligible for
other forms of release, such as executive clemency,”182 are denied a
fundamental requirement of due process.183 Unlike the Arizona courts, the
Supreme Court of the United States’ Solem decision determined the
defendants “argument that he is not likely to actually be released” is
relevant.184 Arizona data comparing the likelihood of obtaining a
commutation of sentence versus parole shows that a prisoner is fifteen times
more likely on average to be released on parole than clemency and in some
years parole applicants are thirty-one times more likely to be released.185
Clemency is neither legally nor factually comparable to parole as an
opportunity to be heard or released.
182. Cota, 272 P.3d at 1042. However, there remains speculation as to what the Arizona
Department of Corrections will actually do when faced with this issue. See Letter from Amy Bjelland,
Gen. Counsel for the Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., to Judge Hotham, RE: Joyce, Justin Jacob (Jan. 14, 2004).
[hereinafter Letter].
183. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)) (“A fundamental requirement of due process is ‘the opportunity to be heard.’ It is an
opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (internal
citations omitted)).
184. Solem, 463 U.S. at 302-03; see, e.g., State v. Hargrave, 234 P.3d 569, 583 (Ariz. 2010)
(“Hargrave’s argument that he is not likely to actually be released does not render the instruction legally
incorrect.” (citing State v. Dann, 207 P.3d 604 (Ariz. 2009)); id. (citing State v. Cruz, 181 P.3d 196
(Ariz. 2008) (finding that trial court did not err in precluding Board chairman from testifying as to how
life sentences are handled in Arizona, finding that such testimony was too speculative to be relevant)).
185. Reid, supra note 165 (2004 statistics).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Arizona’s lack of parole consideration after Truth-in-Sentencing creates
three legal deficiencies depending on the sentenced imposed: (1) capital
defendants denied their due process right under Simmons and Lynch III to
inform the jury they would be ineligible for parole are entitled to a new jury
sentencing; (2) prisoners sentenced by the court to life with the possibility
of “parole” after twenty-five years that are denied a parole hearing are
denied a due process right to be heard; and (3) defendants who pled guilty
with a stipulated sentence of life with the possibility of “parole” after
twenty-five years are likely able to either withdraw from their plea
agreements when those deals are breached by the state’s inability to uphold
the promised parole hearings or request the judiciary to order specific
performance on their pleas.186
A. Death Row Simmons Cases after Lynch III
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the first problem
when it overturned the death sentence of Shawn Patrick Lynch in 2016.187
Two different juries convicted Lynch of first degree murder for the 2001
murder of James Panzarella.188 Lynch faced the possibility of death, natural
life, or “life with the possibility of release after 25 years.”189 The first jury
failed to come to a unanimous verdict,190 but the second and third juries
sentenced Lynch to death.191 During the trial, prosecutors suggested that
Lynch could be dangerous in the future.192 The Supreme Court previously
held in Simmons v. South Carolina, that “where the defendant’s future
dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on
parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the
defendant is parole ineligible.”193 Although Arizona law does not currently
offer Lynch the possibility of parole, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the
Simmons instruction and proceeded on the theory that Arizona’s statute
186. See, e.g., State v. Olague, 381 P.3d 269, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). Additionally, prisoners
sentenced to life without the possibility of release for twenty-five years are only able to apply for
clemency as long as Truth-in-Sentencing remains. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85, at 1-2; see
generally Matthew B. Meehan, A Gathering Storm: Future Challenges Necessitate Reform of Arizona’s
Dysfunctional Post-Conviction Regime, 9 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that Truth-inSentencing and clemency create a de-facto natural life sentence which implicate the Eighth
Amendment).
187. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1818 (2016).
188. State v. Lynch (Lynch II), 357 P.3d 119, 127.
189. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–751(A) (emphasis added).
190. State v. Lynch (Lynch I), 234 P.3d 595, 601 (Ariz. 2010).
191. Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 127, rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).
192. Id. at 138.
193. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994).
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authorized the imposition of release-eligible sentences, thus creating a
possibility of parole, even though parole is not currently available.194 Lynch
attempted to waive his right to be considered for a release-eligible sentence
and requested that the jury be instructed regarding his ineligibility for
release, but the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “[p]arole eligibility is not
a right that can be waived” and executive clemency created a possibility of
release.195 In its brief opposing Lynch’s petition for writ of certiorari, the
State suggested that “‘nothing prevents the legislature from creating a
parole system in the future for which [Lynch] would have been eligible had
the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of release after 25
years.’”196
However, in Simmons the Court stated “that the potential for future
‘legislative reform’ could not justify refusing a parole-ineligibility
instruction.”197 Although the trial court’s jury instruction was an accurate
statement of Arizona law,198 “Simmons expressly rejected the argument that
the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant’s right to inform
a jury of his parole ineligibility.”199 The Court granted the petition and
overturned the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court.200
The Court’s Lynch III decision creates an immediate problem for
Arizona’s courts by providing an opening for death row inmates to
challenge their sentences.201 Before Lynch III, the Arizona Supreme Court
rejected a Simmons jury instruction for at least nine eligible defendants,202
while at least four more preserved the issue for appeal.203 Other defendants
who failed to preserve the issue may be able to argue that they received
ineffective assistance of counsel.204 Unlike juvenile offenders sentenced to
natural life before Miller, the Lynch III decision opens a path for several

194. Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 138.
195. Id. at 103-04.
196. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820.
197. Id. (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166).
198. Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1819.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Escalante–Orozco, 386 P.3d at 828-29; State v. Hulsey, 408 P.3d 408 (Ariz. 2018);
State v. Rushing, 404 P.3d 240 (Ariz. 2017), petition for cert. docketed (U.S. April 19, 2018).
202. See State v. Burns, 344 P.3d 303, 325 (Ariz. 2015); State v. Benson, 307 P.3d 19, 30 (Ariz.
2013); Boyston, 298 P.3d at 901; State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 24 (Ariz. 2012); State v. Cota, 272 P.3d
1027, 1042 (Ariz. 2012); Hargrave, 234 P.3d at 582-83; State v. Chappel, 236 P.3d 1176, 1184-85 (Ariz.
2010); State v. Dann, 207 P.3d 604, 617 (Ariz. 2009); Cruz, 181 P.3d at 213.
203. See State v. Reeves, 310 P.3d 970, 976 (Ariz. 2013); State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1160
(Ariz. 2011); State v. Womble, 235 P.3d 244, 253 (Ariz. 2010); see also State v. Hausner, 280 P.3d 604,
631 (Ariz. 2012) (however, Dale Hausner committed suicide in prison on June 19, 2013).
204. See Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (examining the effectiveness of counsel at
the sentencing proceeding).
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death row prisoners to gain post-conviction relief.205 Miller created a new
interpretation of constitutional law.206 Lynch III upheld an interpretation of
constitutional law existing since the Simmons decision in 1994,207 and
reversed the incorrect application of constitutional law by Arizona’s
Supreme Court going back in a string of cases to at least Cruz in 2008.208
Post-conviction relief is always available to prisoners whose sentence
violates the United States Constitution.209 Unlike with juvenile offenders
sentenced to life in prison, it remains to be seen whether death row
prisoners denied due process during sentencing can be precluded from
having their convictions resentenced by a legislative fix reinstating parole
for first degree murder.210 In 2016, Lynch’s case went again before the
Arizona Supreme Court on two issues: (1) whether a Simmons error is
subject to harmless-error analysis and, if so, (2) whether the Simmons error
was harmless.211 However, the court dismissed the case after Lynch died in
prison on November 4, 2017.212
Arizona death row inmates are already using Lynch III to secure new
sentences.213 A jury sentenced Joel Randu Escalante–Orozco to death for
first degree murder, sexual assault, and first-degree burglary which occurred
in 2001.214 At trial, Escalante–Orozco objected to the jury instructions,
arguing that the jurors should not consider his potential for release when

205. See Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820 (discussing that the Arizona Supreme Court confirmed that
parole was unavailable to Lynch under its law, while Simmons and its progeny established Lynch’s right
to inform his jury of that fact).
206. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016) (noting that Miller announced a
substantive rule of constitutional law after analyzing that the vast majority of juvenile offenders faced a
punishment that the law could not oppose on them).
207. See Garza v. Ryan, No. CV-14-01901-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 105983, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11,
2017) (noting that “[Lynch III] does not represent a change in the law. It simply applies existing law to
an Arizona case.”).
208. See, e.g., Cruz, 181 P.3d 196; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Before the Arizona
Supreme Court’s Cruz decision in 2008, the Court considered Simmons inapposite, as “[i]t involved a
sentencing jury . . . [i]n Arizona, the trial judge determines punishment.” State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046,
1057 (Ariz. 1997). Juries started determining punishment in murder cases only after the Supreme Court
held Arizona’s capital sentencing statute unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona and the legislature granted
the jury, not the judge, the responsibility in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death or life
in prison. See 2002 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 5th Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 (S.B. 1001) (West).
209. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a).
210. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (suggesting that a “State may remedy a Miller violation
by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing
them.”).
211. See Appellant’s Supplemental Brief Regarding Harmless Error at 3, State v. Lynch (Lynch
IV) (Ariz. Sept. 30, 2016) (No. CR-12-0359-AP) (on file at the Arizona Supreme Court).
212. See Dismissal Order, Lynch IV (Ariz. Nov. 13, 2017) (No. CR-12-0359-AP) (on file at the
Arizona Supreme Court).
213. See generally Escalante–Orozco, 386 P.3d 798 (depicting a recent case using Lynch III to
secure a new sentence).
214. Id. at 809.
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deciding whether to impose the death penalty.215 “The trial court denied the
objection and refused the requested instruction because it speculated about
the future availability of parole.”216 The court found that “the prosecutor
did not have to explicitly argue future dangerousness for it to be an
issue.”217
The prosecutor made future dangerousness an issue by
introducing evidence that Escalante–Orozco attacked his wife on two
previous occasions.218 The court relied on Lynch III and held that the trial
court must conduct new penalty phase proceedings, reasoning that even if
the error was harmless, the state did not prove “‘beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.’”219
B. Opportunity to be Heard Protected by Due Process
Prisoners sentenced to life with the possibility of parole can have a
recognized right to appear before a parole board under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.220 While there is no inherent right
to parole, a state can create a recognized liberty interest by statute, requiring
due process.221 Minimal due process includes an opportunity to be heard.222
Arizona’s parole statue grants a recognized liberty interest in parole,
protected by the due process clause.223 Accordingly, the Board of Executive
Clemency “must afford Arizona inmates who become eligible for parole an
‘opportunity to be heard.’”224 As written, Arizona’s parole eligibility statute
only applies to a “person who commits a felony offense before January 1,
1994,” or a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment.225 However,
since 1994 the Arizona judiciary has sentenced more than two hundred
defendants to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twentyfive or thirty-five years.226 Many of these prisoners are sentenced under
section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute, which grants the sentencing
judge discretion in sentencing a defendant to either life or natural life.227
215. Id. at 828.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 829.
218. Escalante-Orozco, 386 P.3d at 829.
219. Id. at 830.
220. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5.
221. Id. at 7, 12.
222. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (“[A] prisoner subject to a parole statute . . .
received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a
statement of the reasons why parole was denied.”).
223. Stewart, 753 P.2d at 1199.
224. Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3 2014) at 3.
225. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09(I).
226. List of defendants generated with information provided by the Arizona Department of
Corrections (on file with author).
227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A)(2).
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Other prisoners are sentenced under section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona
Revised Statute, which allows for no discretion and mandates a twenty-five
to life sentence.228
The issue remains whether defendants sentenced to life imprisonment
with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for crimes committed
after 1994 are eligible for parole, which would entitle them to due process
protections, including the opportunity to be heard by a parole board.229 To
determine if the defendants are eligible for parole one must first determine
if a sentence with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years is a lawful
or unlawful sentence.230 Under Arizona law, “[a] trial court has no inherent
power to change a sentence already lawfully imposed.”231 “An unlawful
sentence is one that is outside the statutory range.”232 If life imprisonment
with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years is a valid sentence for the
trial judge to impose, then the ex post facto alteration of that sentence denies
the due process right to a parole hearing and violates the prisoner’s rights
under the double jeopardy clause by increasing a lawfully imposed
sentence.233 In Arizona, “[o]nce a defendant begins to serve a lawful
sentence, he may not be sentenced to an increased term. To do so violates
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.”234 This includes a
defendant’s parole eligibility since, “parole eligibility is a function of the
length of the sentence fixed by the [court].”235 A sentence of life
imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for a crime
committed after 1994 should be considered a lawful sentence because the
sentence has been continuously imposed in the same manner under the exact

228. Id. § 13-1003(D).
229. See generally Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3, 2014) (describing the due process
protection to be heard by the parole board).
230. State v. Suniga, 701 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
231. Id.; see State v. Falkner, 542 P.2d 404, 406 (Ariz. 1975) (holding the trial court does not have
inherent power to modify a sentence); cf. State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792, 796 (Ariz. 1987) (“[T]rial court
apparently overlooked its statutory duty to impose a felony assessment. Because the court was required
to impose the assessment, its initial sentence was unlawful under the statute and it could correct the
sentence to reflect the felony assessment without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy.”).
232. State v. House, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
233. See Suniga, 701 P.2d at 1203 (showing that alteration of an already imposed life sentence is a
violation of double jeopardy).
234. Id.; see Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873).
235. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658 (1974); see United States v.
Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[P]arole eligibility is part of the sentence for the underlying
offense, its terms and conditions are fixed at the moment the underlying offense is complete. Therefore,
like the length of a term of incarceration, the conditions affecting parole eligibility cannot be
retrospectively altered.”); Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 126 (“Parole eligibility is not a right that can be waived.
To the contrary, the eligibility decision is within the trial court’s discretion.”); Benson, 307 P.3d at 32
(“Section 13-751(A) does not confer a ‘right’ to parole eligibility on defendants. Indeed, the statute’s
plain language leaves the eligibility decision squarely within the trial court’s discretion.”).
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same sentencing statutes going back to 1978. The situation is demonstrated
clearest by Arizona’s conspiracy to commit murder sentence.236
Since 1978, under Arizona’s conspiracy statute, the proper sentence is
life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.237 In 1993, the court
found in State v. Milke that section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised
Statute seemed clear and unambiguous.238 In Milke, the defendant “was
convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.”239 The conspiracy
statute provides that “‘[c]onspiracy to commit a class 1 felony is punishable
by a sentence of life without possibility of release [for] 25 years.’”240 The
court found the language of section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised
Statute is “precise, unambiguous, and leaves no room for interpretation.”241
The trial court imposed “a concurrent life sentence without possibility of
parole for 25 years for conspiracy[.]”242 The court reasoned that the
sentence imposed by the trial court on the conspiracy count was proper.243
Under Arizona’s conspiracy statute, the proper sentence is life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years, even if the crime occurred after
1994.244 In State v. Anderson,245 the court sentenced Frank Anderson for
murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy occurring in 1996.246 The court
sentenced Anderson to “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for twenty-five years for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder[.]”247
Upholding the sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that “the
sentence imposed for the conspiracy conviction—life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for twenty-five years—was authorized without any
finding of aggravating circumstances.”248
Section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised Statute, last amended in
1978, provides a mandatory indeterminate life sentence for defendants

236. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) (indicating the length of imprisonment
for conspiracy to commit a felony).
237. See, e.g., Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736 (D. Ariz. 2008) (2000 conspiracy); State v.
Milke, 865 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1993) (1989 murder & conspiracy); State v. Bigger 254 P.3d 1142 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2011) (2002 murder & conspiracy); State v. Robles, 901 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (1991
conspiracy).
238. Milke, 865 P.2d at 791.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D) (1993)).
241. Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681, 682 (Ariz. 1992)) (“If a statute’s language is clear
and unambiguous, the court will give it effect without resorting to other rules of statutory construction.”
(citing State v. Arnett, 579 P.2d. 542, 555 (1978))).
242. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
243. Milke, 865 P.2d at 791.
244. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D).
245. 111 P.3d 369 (2005).
246. Id. at 377.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 401.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss2/3

28

Puzauskas and Morrow: NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE

2018] NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE

291

convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.249 It is an
indeterminate sentence, with the court fixing the minimum and maximum
term, in these cases a twenty-five (or thirty-five) year minimum and a
maximum life term, but a parole board determines at what precise point
between the minimum and maximum that the prisoner is ready for
release.250 The court, in both Milke and Anderson, imposed identical
sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twentyfive years for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.251 At first, this
situation appears to conflict with section 41-1604.09(I) of the Arizona
Revised Statute, which only applies parole eligibility to a “person who
commits a felony offense before January 1, 1994,” or juvenile offenders
sentenced to life imprisonment.252 However, if a sentence of life without
possibility of parole for twenty-five years is a lawful sentence, then the
State of Arizona concedes that there is a recognized liberty interest in parole
protected by due process.253 Failing to honor the sentence with parole
eligibility imposed by the trial court in cases like Anderson would result in
the increase of a sentence from one with parole, to a sentence without
parole. The Supreme Court of the United States previously held that “life
without parole is ‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law,’ . . .
[and] share[s] some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by
no other sentences.”254 Additionally, any alternative interpretation would
lead to an indeterminate sentence without parole, a concept not
contemplated by the Arizona legislature or any legislature before in
American penal history,255 and in fact is the opposite of the legislation’s
apparent purpose.256 Finally, the Arizona Supreme Court held in 2008 that
no state law prohibits a defendant’s release on parole after serving twentyfive years, 257 referring to section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute, a
statute that provides for the possibility of the same sentence as section 13-

249. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D); see Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 116 (1991).
250. See LAROE, supra note 43.
251. Milke, 865 P.2d at 790; Anderson, 111 P.3d at 377.
252. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09(I).
253. Stewart, P.2d at 1199; Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3, 2014).
254. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
1001 (1991)).
255. See Phoenix v. Superior Court, 696 P.2d 724, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)(“The courts will
avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.”).
256. See Vera, 334 P.3d at 760 (“[I]n imposing a sentence of ‘life without parole for twenty-five
(25) years,’ the court clearly believed this alternative sentence would provide Vera with a meaningful
opportunity of release . . . .”).
257. Cruz, 181 P.3d at 207 (citing A.R.S. § 13–703(A) (2004), renumbered as § 13-751 in 2009).
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1003(D).258 Regarding a murder in the year 2000 under the same statute the
Court:
conclude[d] the statute is equally clear that the legislature intended
to provide one sentencing option for persons convicted of firstdegree murder other than death: a life term of imprisonment. The
legislature gave trial judges the discretion to choose alternative
conditions for that life term—natural life or life with the possibility
of parole in twenty-five or thirty-five years[.]259
Therefore, it seems clear that a sentence with a parole possibility after
twenty-five years is a valid sentence, entitling prisoners thus sentenced a
guaranteed due process right to a parole hearing. Any statute to the contrary
is unconstitutional under the due process clause.
Even if a sentence is unlawful, unless the original sentence is vacated,
the trial court can only correct the sentence within “60 days of the entry of
judgment and sentence” but before the defendant’s appeal, if any, is
perfected.260 The state must appeal (or cross-appeal) in order to challenge
an illegally lenient sentence otherwise the court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to alter such a sentence.261 However, on a number of occasions
the Arizona appellate courts appear to be acting without lawful
jurisdiction.262 When a sentence is vacated, “the court may not impose a
sentence for the same offense . . . which is more severe than the earlier
sentence unless . . . the earlier sentence was unlawful and it is corrected so
the court may impose a lawful sentence.”263 Nor is there precedent that the
court is required to vacate a sentence just because it is unlawful. In an
ineffective assistance of counsel case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
“[a]lthough defendant was improperly advised that he was statutorily
entitled to parole eligibility in 25 years, this error is harmless because he
actually received the illegally lenient sentence promised.”264 Finally, if a
sentence is unlawful, an ex post facto alteration of the sentence by amending
258. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) ( which says, “punishable by a sentence of
life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis until the service of twenty-five years . . .
.”), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A)(3) (which says, “If the defendant is sentenced to life, the
defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar
years . . . .”).
259. Fell, 97 P.3d at 912, aff’d, 115 P.3d 594 (Ariz. 2005) (emphasis added).
260. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 24.3.
261. State v. Dawson, 792 P.2d 741, 749 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that the court will not correct
sentencing errors that benefit a defendant, in the context of his own appeal, absent a proper appeal or
cross-appeal by the state).
262. See, e.g., Godinez, 2013 WL 3788427, at *14; State v. Schwartz, No. 2 CA-CR 2006-0213,
2008 WL 4516336, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008).
263. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 26.14.
264. State v. Kinslow, 799 P.2d 844, 848 (Ariz. 1990).
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the minute entry is inappropriate.265 Considering the large number of cases
with defendants sentenced to a specific parole eligibility state, if the
sentences are held unlawful, the courts should also follow the precedent that
“[a] sentence that is ‘so ambiguous that it fails to reveal its meaning ‘with
fair certainty,’’ is illegal.”266 Regardless of the sentence’s lawfulness, the
government cannot seek the death penalty on resentencing from a life
sentence,267 and if a prisoner is released on parole, the government is
estopped from re-incarcerating an erroneously released prisoner.268
C. When the Absence of Parole Voids Plea Deals
Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing scheme is also problematic for
defendants whose plea agreements specify parole eligibility, if parole does
not exist.269 “‘Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to
contract interpretation.’”270 Ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement
are construed against the government, “in light of the parties’ respective
265. See State v. Bowles, 841 P.2d 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that when there is
discrepancy between oral pronouncement of sentence and minute entry that cannot be resolved by
reference to the record, remand for re-clarification of sentence is appropriate); cf. State v. Heri, No. 1
CA–CR 11–0612, 2012 WL 3761561, *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012) (“It is clear that the trial court
was sentencing Heri to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 35 years. To avoid any possible
ambiguity, we hereby order that the formal sentence be clarified to be life in prison with possibility of
parole after 35 years.”). (2007 murder) (emphasis added).
266. See United States v. Contreras-Subias, 13 F.3d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring
defendant to serve the sentence both concurrently and consecutively to another federal sentence was so
ambiguous as to be illegal).
267. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (considering a sentence of life imprisonment an
acquittal of the death sentence for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause).
268. See Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (where a prisoner had been led to
believe he was to be eligible for parole at the time that he was released); see also United States v.
Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D.D.C. 1979) (recognizing, that in some cases, “fundamental principles
of liberty and justice,” would be violated if a person were required to serve the remainder of a prison
sentence after he had been released prematurely from custody through no fault of his own, and had made
a good adjustment to society).
269. See State v. Rosario, 987 P.2d 226, 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that Rosario committed
his crimes after the date on which the legislature enacted laws eliminating the possibility of parole for
crimes committed after that date, but Rosario’s plea agreement provided that he would not be eligible for
release from confinement until serving at least one-half the sentence imposed by the court.).
270. State v. Rivera, 109 P.3d 83, 88 (Ariz. 2005) (citing Coy v. Fields, 27 P.3d 799, 802 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2001); see United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d 549, 555-56 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the
contract law principle of mutual mistake of fact to evaluate a challenge to a guilty plea); United States v.
Williams, 198 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Johnson, 187 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th
Cir.1999) (“Plea agreements are contracts, and the government is held to the literal terms of the
agreement.”); United States v. Standiford, 148 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the contract law
principle of condition subsequent to a challenge to a guilty plea); Margalli-Olvera v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and
are interpreted according to general contract principles.” ); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281
(7th Cir. 1983) (“A plea bargain is, in law, just another contract.”); see generally John F. Gallagher,
Criminal Law - Constitutional Contract - Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements if State Proves Material
Breach (State v. Rivest), 66 MARQ. L. REV. 193 (1982) (analyzing constitutional contract theory).
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bargaining power and expertise.”271 One of the possible remedies for a
breach in a plea agreement contract is specific performance.272 The state’s
inability to provide the promised parole eligibility likely requires specific
performance for the parole hearing, otherwise the plea agreement is likely
void, thereby necessitating a new plea or trial.273
1. Breach
A guilty plea is void if it is induced by promises or threats which
deprive it of the character of a voluntary act.274 When a defendant enters
into a plea agreement, he waives his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.275 A defendant may not waive this constitutional right unless he does
so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.276 A plea does not qualify as
intelligently accepted unless a criminal defendant first receives “‘real notice
of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally
recognized requirement of due process.’”277 The defendant must also be
advised by competent counsel, be in control of his mental faculties, and be
made aware of the nature of the charges against him.278 A plea is
voluntarily accepted if the defendant accepts with “an awareness of its
ramifications, and to that end . . . is apprised of the range of sentence and
the rights forfeited by a plea of guilty.”279 Before accepting a guilty plea in
Arizona, a trial court must inform the defendant of the nature and “range of
possible sentence for the offense to which” the plea is offered, including
“any special conditions regarding sentencing, parole, or commutation
imposed by statute.”280 If the record is silent, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently made.281
271. United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993).
272. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (stating that the state court was in a
better position to decide whether the circumstances required only that there be specific performance of
the plea agreement ); see also Hovey v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 416, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 1 1990)
(“Specific performance provides the only appropriate relief.”); State v. Georgeoff, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188
(Ariz. 1990) (stating that a defendant may seek specific performance if he or she learns of a breach at or
before sentencing ).
273. Hovey, 798 P.2d at 420.
274. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986)).
275. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264.
276. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that the standard under which an
accused has waived the right to counsel also applies to determining whether a guilty plea was voluntarily
made).
277. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998).
278. Id. at 619.
279. State v. Contreras, 542 P.2d 17, 19 (Ariz. 1975).
280. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2 (a)(1)-(2).
281. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 423 (9th Cir. 1976).
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If a defendant bases his decision to plead guilty upon his belief that he
could be paroled at one-half of his incarceration terms, he has raised a
colorable claim.282
Edward Rosario’s plea agreement provided “if
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the Defendant is not eligible for
release from confinement on any basis until having served not less than onehalf the sentence imposed by the court. Eligibility or release shall be
determined by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”283 However, Rosario
committed his crimes after January 1, 1994 and is not eligible for parole
under section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute.284 The court held
that “[i]f Rosario based his decision to plead to the offenses based upon his
belief that he could be paroled at one-half of his incarceration terms, he has
raised a colorable claim.”285 The court reasoned that “‘[a] defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he presents a colorable claim, that is
a claim which, if defendant’s allegations are true, might have changed the
outcome.’”286
A plea may be rendered involuntary not only if the court fails to
adequately explain the material consequences of a guilty plea, but also if the
state materially breaches the plea agreement.287 In 2010, Jesus Godinez
pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and four counts of
aggravated assault.288 The Court sentenced Godinez to two concurrent
sentences of “life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 25 calendar
years,” as indicated in the written plea agreement.289 During settlement,
both defense counsel and the prosecutor “referred intermittently to the
possibility of ‘release’ and ‘parole’ after twenty-five years, including
references to possible appearances in front of the parole board.”290 Despite
this, the trial court found “Godinez nonetheless was informed ‘correctly’
that he would be eligible for release.”291 The appellate court disagreed and
remanded the case to determine if parole eligibility was material to
Godinez’s decision to plead guilty.292
282. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230; see State v. Agboghidi, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0103-PR, 2013 WL
1955858, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 13, 2013) (defendant arguing that the trial court erred in concluding
that “he would have accepted the plea agreement even had he understood the distinction between
commutation and parole.”).
283. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230 (citing A.R.S. § 41-1604.09).
284. Id.
285. Id. (citing Appeal in Yuma County Juvenile Action J-95-63, 902 P.2d 834 (Ariz. Ct.
App.1995)); State v. Bryant, 650 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Ariz. Ct. App.1982).
286. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230 (quoting State v. Watton, 793 P.2d 80, 85 (Ariz. 1990)).
287. State v. Ross, 804 P.2d 112, 116-17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
288. Godinez, 2013 WL 3788427, at *1.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at *3.
292. Id. at *5.
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While the courts in Rosario and Godinez require that the defendant
would not have accepted the plea agreement if he had known that parole
was not a real possibility, a defendant who is unaware he would not be
parole eligible until he served his minimum sentence when he pled guilty, is
prejudiced by his lack of understanding of the sentencing statute and the
failure to inform him is reversible error.293 In cases like Godinez, the
defendants are unaware they will never be parole eligible.294 Since the
sentences contain provisions affecting the manner in which the sentence or
date of parole is to be computed, a defendant who is not aware of the
impossibility of parole should have his guilty plea vacated.295 Even if the
state argues that the word parole should equate to “release,” if the defendant
believed that parole referred to the statutory definition found under Arizona
law then consensus ad idem is impossible and therefore there is no plea
agreement.296
2. Remedy
Failure to provide a parole hearing after a defendant serves twenty-five
years would constitute a breach of the plea agreement and entitle the
defendant either to specific performance, or to have the sentence vacated.297
Specific performance is desirable from a public policy perspective,298 and
has legal precedence.299 Otherwise, vacating the plea agreement after
serving twenty-five years in prison could possibly subject the defendant to a
new indictment,300 and the state would then be left to attempt to retry a
293. State v. Dishong, 594 P.2d 84, 85 (Ariz. 1979); State v. Cuthbertson, 570 P.2d 1075, 1077
(Ariz. 1977).
294. See, e.g., State v. Ware, No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0124-PR, 2015 WL 2131107 (Ariz. Ct. App.
May 7, 2015) (stating that the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole
pursuant to a plea agreement); Sperberg, 2010 WL 4286203 (stating same statement as Ware).
295. See State v. Ellis, 572 P.2d 791, 795 (Ariz. 1977) (“If the sentence contains any provision
that the defendant was not aware of, that affects the manner in which the sentence or date of parole is
computed, either the guilty plea should be vacated or the case remanded to determine if the defendant
was actually aware of the provision absent from the record.”); see also State v. Brock, 789 P.2d 390, 393
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]neligibility to earn release credits is a special condition regarding sentence
imposed by statute, of which a defendant must be made aware under Rule 17.2(b), and not . . . merely a
‘collateral matter’ of which a defendant need not be informed.”).
296. See Coy, 27 P.3d at 803 (holding the state accountable for knowing Arizona law when it
negotiates, drafts, and enters into plea agreements); see also Raffles v. Wichelhaus, EWHC Exch. J19,
(1864) 2 Hurl. & C. 906 (interpreting a contract against the Draftsmen).
297. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; see State v. Bloom, 669 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(stating that flagrant violations of a plea agreement are never harmless error.).
298. See supra Part II.
299. See United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185, 187 (7th Cir.1977) (“Since
[Defendant] has substantially begun performing his side of the bargain, it would not be fair to vacate the
plea and require him to go through the procedure anew. Fundamental fairness can be had by limiting his
term of custody to that portion of the sentence which comports with the bargain made.”).
300. See United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the frustration of
purpose doctrine to permit the government to re-indict the defendant); United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d
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twenty-five year old murder case.301 However, if the Arizona Legislature
remedies the appropriate statutes and grants parole eligibility to all prisoners
sentenced to indeterminate life sentences, the state will not be in breach of
its plea agreements.302
A court can order specific performance on a plea agreement, even if the
sentence would be otherwise unlawful.303 In Buckley v. Terhune, the
defendant entered into a plea agreement believing he was being sentenced to
a maximum of fifteen years in prison for second degree murder, but was
subsequently sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years to life, the
mandatory term for the offense.304 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the agreement had been breached and that specific performance was the
only viable remedy because the defendant had already fulfilled his
obligations under the plea agreement, including testifying against his codefendants, and serving his bargained-for sentence of fifteen years.305 In
granting habeas relief, the court noted that it had arrived at its decision
“notwithstanding the state’s argument that a determinate fifteen year prison
term is not a lawful sentence for second degree murder.”306 It also noted
that, “[c]onsistent or not with the state’s sentencing statute . . . [the
defendant] has fulfilled his promises and it is now too late for the state to
argue that it was not in a position to offer him a fifteen year sentence in
exchange.”307

1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). But see United States v. Gaither, 926 F. Supp. 50, 52 (M.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that while the defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea was like the application of the
impracticability doctrine, the government was not free to re-indict); see also DiCesare v. United States,
646 F. Supp. 544, 546-48 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the government could not re-indict the
defendant because the defendant’s successful habeas corpus challenge to conviction did not amount to a
breach of the agreement).
301. See e.g., Echols v. State, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Ark. 2010); Gavin Lesnick, Plea Reached in
ONLINE
(Aug.
19,
2011,
2:46
PM),
West
Memphis
Murders,
ARK.
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2011/aug/19/breaking-plea-reached-west-memphismurders/?breaking (after sixteen years in prison, convicted murderer released on time-served plea after
state supreme court reversed conviction).
302. Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1349 (N.J. 1982) (“Within the time set for
performance in the contract, the seller’s right to cure is unconditional.”).
303. See Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the trial court failed
to “fulfill petitioner’s reasonable understanding of the plea agreement . . . .”); see also Palermo v.
Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that under Santobello,
unauthorized prosecutorial promise of parole for prior offense was entitled to specific performance). But
see Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959 (Colo.1999) (holding that plea agreement calling for an illegal
sentence invalidated the guilty plea and could not be specifically enforced).
304. Buckley, 441 F.3d at 691-93.
305. Id. at 699.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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It is also possible for the court to order the defendant released from
prison at the end of the sentence for which the defendant bargained for.308
In Rodriguez v. United States, after the defendant’s plea was vacated due to
a change in law, the district court denied the government’s motion to restore
the original indictment.309 The court reasoned that the parties cannot be
restored to their positions prior to the plea agreement.310 The court further
reasoned that “the restoration of the former indictment would have the
effect of conferring upon the Government the sizable benefit of Rodriguez’s
incarceration without obligating the Government to provide anything in
return, a scenario the Court finds to be impermissible.”311
A defendant who pleas guilty in exchange for parole eligibility after
twenty-five years may be entitled to release after twenty-five years.312 If the
defendant is given reasonable reason to believe that twenty-five years was
the maximum sentence pled to, then under Buckley, that defendant should
be ordered released from prison, for the defendant would have upheld his
part of the contract.313 However, if a defendant is denied a parole hearing, it
is in the interest of both the state and the defendant for the court to order
specific performance for the defendant to be heard by the parole board.314
Specific performance is in accordance with the public policy goal of parole,
even if it might be contrary to statutory text.315 Specific performance also
prevents the state from unduly benefiting from the defendants twenty-five
years of imprisonment if the defendant is allowed to withdraw but the state
is permitted to re-indict.316 Finally, specific performance puts both the
government and the defendant in the position they believed they were in
when the plea was originally negotiated.317 All of these remedies will be
moot if the legislature fixes the unintended vagueness of the indeterminate
sentencing statutes and authorizes those prisoners to be parole eligible with
a statutory fix similar to the one used to make juvenile defendants parole
eligible.
308. See Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying the
Government’s motion to restore the original indictment).
309. Id. at 280-83.
310. Id. at 283.
311. Id.
312. See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 692. (Buckley pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence of a
maximum of fifteen years).
313. Id. at 699.
314. See id. at 702 n.11 (noting that in a case in which the state has already received the benefit of
the bargain, the harm caused by its breach is generally best repaired by specific performance of the plea
agreement).
315. United Steelworkers, Etc. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). It is a familiar rule, that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers. See id.
316. Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 283.
317. Id.
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V. ARIZONA’S INDETERMINATE SENTENCING LAWS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Neither the Arizona executive nor the judicial branch have been able to
establish the consequences for a criminal defendant sentenced to “life with
the possibility of release.”
The Due Process Clause requires a criminal statute “give adequate
guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the
nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in
trying those who are accused.”318 Therefore, a criminal sentencing scheme
can be challenged on vagueness grounds, and the scheme is void for
vagueness if it fails to state with “sufficient clarity the consequences of
violating a given criminal statute.”319
Any statute can be found
unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide persons of ordinary
intelligence reasonable notice of prohibited behavior and if it “fails to
provide explicit standards for those who apply it,” allowing for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.320
The Arizona judicial and executive
branches have offered conflicting and contradictory interpretations of
whether inmates sentenced to “life with parole” or “life with release” are
actually entitled to parole and therefore any statute that provides for these
sentences are unconstitutional and must be voided for vagueness.321
A statute that provides two conflicting penalties for the same conduct is
unconstitutionally vague.322 In 2000, Arizona’s stalking statute punished
indistinguishable conduct as both a class three and as a class five felony.323
In Anderson, the court held the stalking statute unconstitutionally vague.324
The court further held that, “[w]here a statute is subject to more than one
interpretation, the rule of lenity requires that doubts be resolved in favor of
the defendant and against imposing the harsher punishment.”325
A statutory scheme providing for mandatory lifetime parole and
conviction, that does not provide a penalty for violation of parole, is
unconstitutionally vague and violates separation of powers.326 In State v.
318. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948).
319. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
320. State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874, 876 (Ariz. 1988) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108–09 (1972)).
321. See State v. Anderson, 16 P.3d 214, 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that Arizona Revised
Statute § 13-2923 is unconstitutionally vague); see also Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 125 (noting that the Court
is left the task of interpreting a vague penalty provision without any reasonably alternatives from which
to choose).
322. Anderson, 16 P.3d at 220.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. (citing to Cawley v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 701 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984)).
326. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126.
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Wagstaff, a criminal statute mandated, “that lifetime parole be imposed by
the court as part of a convicted offender’s sentence.”327 The court found
that the executive agencies are responsible “for executing the judgment and
sentence as well as for determining the terms and conditions upon which
parole may be granted.”328 The Court further found that,
[b]y including a parole provision as part of the sentence but failing
to state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a
condition of the sentence, the legislature left the task of discerning
those consequences to the judiciary.329 The task of resolving
ambiguity and filling gaps in this statute goes beyond the proper
judicial task of construing statutes.330
The court held the statute providing for mandatory imposition of lifetime
parole without fixing a penalty for violation of that part of the sentence
violated the separation of powers.331 The court further held that “the statute
creates the potential for conflict between the executive and judicial branches
and places the judiciary in a constitutionally impermissible position. By its
very words, the statute gives power to both the courts and the Board of
Pardons and Paroles to dictate different parole conditions.”332 The court
reasoned that, “statutory language must be sufficiently definite so that those
responsible for executing the law may do so in a rational and reasoned
manner.”333
Even Arizona’s high court has displayed confusion over whether or not
the possibility of parole still exists after the 1994 statute. In Wagner, the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s capital sentencing statute after
rejecting a void for vagueness challenge in the context of arbitrary judicial
decision-making during sentencing proceedings; however, in doing so the
court erroneously cited to previous versions of the statute that have been
superseded by its current iteration.334 The defendant challenged his
sentence of life without the possibility of parole under the void for
vagueness doctrine, alleging the statute “does not provide sentencing
guidelines for a judge to use in deciding whether to impose a life or a
327. Id. at 121.
328. Id. at 121-22. Recall that “parole eligibility is a function of the length of the sentence fixed by
the [court].” Warden, 417 U.S. at 658.
329. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126.
330. Id. “[T]here are limits beyond which we cannot go in finding what [the legislature] has not
put into so many words or in making certain what it has left undefined or too vague for reasonable
assurance of its meaning.” United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948)).
331. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126.
332. Id. at 122.
333. Id. at 125.
334. State v. Wagner, 982 P.2d 270, 270 (Ariz. 1999).
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natural life sentence and therefore permits arbitrary enforcement of the
law.”335 Wagner committed the murder in 1994, when the applicable statute
forbade the possibility for parole.336 Curiously, the Supreme Court’s
Wagner opinion did not cite to the murder statute as it existed at the time of
Wagner’s offense,337 and concluded that the statute “states with clarity that
the punishment for committing first degree murder is either death, natural
life, or life in prison with the possibility of parole.”338 The Wagner Court’s
failure to accurately define the statutory range of punishment(s) someone
faces for committing first degree murder is ironic in the face of a void
vagueness challenge; if the statute is too vague for a state’s highest court to
understand, then “a person of mere ordinary intelligence”339 will be unable
to determine the meaning of the law.
Confusion over the possibility of parole extends to the trial courts. In
2001, Justin Joyce pled guilty to first degree murder and received a sentence
of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.340 In 2003 the
Arizona Department of Corrections informed Joyce that he was not parole
eligible.341 Joyce’s sentencing Judge, Jeffrey A. Hotham, stated in a minute
entry, “although currently not eligible for parole consideration, the
Defendant will be eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty-five
calendar years.”342 In response, the Department of Corrections sent a letter
to Judge Hotham, stating that “there was no stated review for release from a
Life sentence after twenty-five calendar years[.] The [Arizona] Department
of Correction has asked and has not yet received an opinion from the
Attorney General’s Office on how to review and release this type of
inmate.”343 Judge Hotham made it expressly clear that Joyce is eligible for
a parole hearing in 2026, and “[t]rial judges ‘are presumed to know the law
and to apply it in making their decisions.’”344

335. Id. at 271.
336. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 745-46 (“If the court does not sentence the defendant to natural life,
the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five
calendar years.”).
337. See generally Wagner, 982 P.2d 270. Additionally, in a footnote in the opinion, the court
quoted the 1988 version of the sentencing statute. Compare Id. at 274 n.1 with 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws
455.
338. Wagner, 982 P.2d at 273 (emphasis added).
339. Id.
340. Docket Entry, State v. Joyce, (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. Dec. 5, 2003).
341. Minute Entry, State v. Joyce, (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. Dec. 5, 2003),
http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/122003/m1224317.pdf.
342. Id. (emphasis in original).
343. See Letter, supra note 182.
344. State v. Lee, 944 P.2d 1222, 1230 (Ariz. 1997) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
653 (1990)).
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The conflict over parole eligibility received attention in the Arizona
Republic on March 19, 2017.345 Within eleven days after the first article,
the newspaper reported that the Arizona Department of Corrections had
issued an update to its Department Order Manual for Inmate Release
Eligibility.346 The updated order now includes “inmates who were
sentenced to Life with a minimum number of years to serve (i.e., 25 or 35
years)” as eligible for parole.347 A statement from the Arizona Governor’s
Office said, “‘the intent is to provide additional clarity, not to modify
existing statute.’”348 However the new order does not reflect the text of the
Department of Correction’s authorizing statute.349 Nor does the order
require the Board of Executive Clemency to grant a parole hearing under
the Board’s authorizing statute.350 Instead of providing “additional clarity”
the Board policy update deepens the uncertainty in whether parole is
available and furthers the conflict between different parts of Arizona’
government.
While the executive branch fails to offer clarity, the Arizona Supreme
Court has a long history upholding a defendant’s parole eligibility when the
statutes would suggest otherwise.351 As the Court recently indexed in
Benson, where the defendant committed two murders in 2004, under section
13-751, “Arizona law does not make Benson ineligible for parole.”352
There are other occasions where this has been called into question. Hardy
committed murder in 2005, Cruz committed murder in 2003, and Hargrave
committed murder in 2002.353 The court held that each of them could be
eligible for parole, even though the statute these men were charged under
provides for an ‘opportunity for release,’ and Arizona’s parole eligibility
statute applies to a “person who commits a felony offense before January 1,
1994.”354
345. See Generally, Michael Kiefer, supra note 13(stating that in 1994 Arizona replaced parole
with a system that essentially forecloses parole eligibility).
346. Id.
347. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., DEPARTMENT ORDER MANUAL: No. 1002, INMATE RELEASE
ELIGIBILITY SYSTEM, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2017).
348. Michael Kiefer, supra note 13.
349. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1604.09.
350. See Id. § 31–412.
351. See generally Benson, 307 P.3d 19 (finding that Petitioner was eligible for parole).
352. Id. at 32 (citing ARIZ .REV .STAT. § 13–751(A)) (“Consequently, the trial court did not err by
refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with Simmons (citing Hardy, 283 P.3d at 24)). “Simmons
instructions are not required when ‘[n]o state law . . . prohibit[s the defendant’s] release on parole.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (citing Cruz, 181 P.3d at 207 (noting that, “[n]o state law would have prohibited
Cruz’s release on parole after serving twenty-five years.”); see also Id (citing Hargrave, 234 P.3d at
582–83 (“noting a Simmons instruction is not required even when a defendant is not likely to be released
if given a life sentence.”).
353. Hardy, 283 P.3d at 16; see Cruz, 181 P.3d at 203; see also Hargrave, 234 P.3d at 575.
354. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1604.09.
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With the understanding that ‘release’ includes ‘parole,’ Arizona’s
murder statute should become clear, but conflict remains. In a recent 2018
federal district court Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge
found that a plain reading of Arizona’s first degree murder sentencing
statute indicates that the types of release excluded from a natural life
sentence (commutation, parole, work furlough, work release, or release
from confinement) are not excluded from a sentence of life with
“release.”355 The court concluded that it logically follows that “since these
forms of release are not excluded, they are included.”356 Other Arizona
statutes also indicate that ‘post-conviction release,’ means “parole, work
furlough, community supervision, [and] probation[.]”357 But as the
exchange between the trial judge and the Department of Corrections in the
Joyce case shows, Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing system has put the
executive and judicial branches into conflict.358 The judicial branch is
sentencing defendants under the same laws that existed years before Truthin-Sentencing came into effect, and yet the Department of Corrections is
given no statutory mechanism to review these parole eligible inmates. If
neither the life and natural life sentences of section 13-751 of the Arizona
Revised Statute afford an opportunity for release, then the statute is
providing two identical penalties for the same conduct.359 The confusion
caused by Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes is so great, that not
only does its meaning evade people of “ordinary intelligence,” their
interpretation has confused and befuddled Arizona’s highest court.
Therefore, Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes, sections 13–705,
13-706, 13-751, and 13-1003, must be found unconstitutionally vague.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Arizona has already gone through a recent change in its laws relating to
“life” sentences and parole eligibility.360 In 2012, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of
parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama.361
This ruling effectively makes Arizona’s capital sentencing statute

355. See Viramontes v. Ryan, CV-16-00151-TUC-RM, at 18 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2018) (Questioning
“the propriety of sentencing a defendant to life with the possibility of “release” after 25 years without
permitting any significant possibility of release.”).
356. Id. at 15.
357. Id. § 13-4401(for the purposes of Chapter 40) (emphasis added).
358. See Minute Entry, State v. Joyce, Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. (Dec. 5, 2003); see also
Letter, supra note 182.
359. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751.
360. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
361. Id.
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unconstitutional when applied to juveniles.362 Therefore, in 2014, the
Arizona legislature extended parole eligibility to juveniles serving life
sentences in prison.363 This change keeps seventy-five convicted juvenile
offenders in prison until they are given an opportunity to be heard by a
parole board.364 If Arizona’s adult indeterminate sentences are overturned,
then Arizona’s legislature will be forced again to amend the statute and give
the defendants a mechanism to be heard by a parole board. The legislature
could preempt the resulting rush of litigation by amending the parole statute
before the sentencing statutes are overturned. This would have the effect of
keeping the death sentences for capital defendants intact, saving the state
from re-prosecuting old cases after the plea bargains are vacated and
restoring Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing systems to their designed
public interest purpose of rehabilitation and deterrence.

362. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); see State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 393
(Ariz. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 467 (2017) (ongoing litigation regarding juvenile non-mandatory
natural life sentences).
363. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–716; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 718 (determining
that Miller is a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review).
364. Michael Kiefer, Arizona Supreme Court Reviews Life Sentences for Minors, AZCENTRAL
(Dec. 23, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2016/12/23/arizona-courtrule-sentencings-tucson-murder-cases-asdfa/95790448/.
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